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1. INTRODUCTION
Social learning—by observing and copying others—is a highly successful cultural mechanism for adap-
tation, outperforming individual information acquisition and experience [Rendell et al. 2010]. This
ability is important for the spreading of best practices [Pentland 2012], useful information [Mason and
Watts 2012], healthy habits [Centola 2010], and cooperation [Fowler and Christakis 2010].
Here, we investigate social learning in the context of the uniquely human capacity for reflective,
analytical reasoning. A hallmark of the human mind is our ability to engage analytical reasoning,
and suppress false associative intuitions [Kahneman 2011]. Networks can serve two purposes in re-
lation to analytic reasoning. First, networks may propagate analytical reasoning processes. That is,
individuals who witness rational decisions going against their intuition may be prompted to reflect
and spontaneously switch to a more analytic thinking style in subsequent, similar tasks. We refer to
this phenomenon as the contagion of analytical processing. Another possibility is that networks prop-
agate correct responses to analytic problems. That is, individuals who witness rational decisions going
against their intuition may recognize their intuition as incorrect, and adopt the correct decision, but
do so without engaging analytic reasoning themselves. Thus, increased connectivity, by increasing the
availability of diverse information sources, may enable individuals to obtain higher-quality informa-
tion and perspectives, without necessarily being able to generate similar insights independently. We
refer to this phenomenon as the contagion of analytical output.
We ran 5 lab-based network sessions, involving 20 subjects each. In each session, subjects sat at in-
dividual computer workstations and solved a series of analytic problems. Each subject was randomly
assigned to a node in an underlying network, which determined the neighbors (in the sense of the net-
work, rather than physical proximity) whose responses were visible to the subject. Different network
topologies were used in five sessions (20 participants each). The first session provided a baseline con-
dition in which subjects were not connected to any neighbor, and thus did not see any of the other par-
ticipants’ responses. The other sessions spanned a wide range of possible structures: fully connected,
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph, Baraba´si-Albert graph with hubs, and a highly clustered graphs.
Subjects were asked to solve a series of 3 questions (see table) known as the Cognitive Reflection Test
(CRT) [Frederick 2005]. They require engaging analytic reasoning to overcome an incorrect intuition.
No particular skill or knowledge is required to generate the correct answer – only the engagement of
effortful, analytic reasoning process. Thus, there is no particular ‘trick’ which, once learned, can be
used in subsequent tasks. The subject should simply recognize that initial intuition cannot be trusted,
and a more reflective attitude is needed.
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Question Intuitive Correct
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the
patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
24 47
If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how many minutes would it take 100 machines
to make 100 widgets?
100 5
A bat & a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? 10 c 5 c
Each subject answered 5 trials for each of the 3 questions. In the first trial, subjects responded inde-
pendently. In the subsequent trials 2 to 5, subjects could see the responses that their network neighbors
entered in previous rounds. No information was given about the accuracy of these responses. Subjects
were informed that they would accumulate monetary rewards for every correct response they gave, on
every trial. This setup provides an ideal test-bed to pit analytical process contagion against analytical
output contagion. Output contagion should improve performance from one trial to the next (within
each question), but not from one question to the next. Process contagion should improve performance
from one question to the next, in addition to improving performance from one trial to the next.
2. RESULTS
Subjects’ performance appears in the figure below. Separate logistic regressions were conducted in each
topology. To detect process contagion, we tested whether the performance of subjects in each of our four
topologies improved across questions, over and above the progression observed in the baseline condi-
tion. For example, in the case of the Clustered topology, we conducted a logistic regression in which the
predictors were the question (first, second, third), the topology (Baseline, Clustered), and their inter-
action. The dependent measure was the performance (correct or incorrect) during the first trial of each
question. What counts as evidence for process contagion is a significant interaction between question
and topology, showing that increase in performance in the network group is greater than increase in
performance in the Baseline group. We detected no such significant interaction for any topology, all
z < 1.05, all p > .28. Performance never improves significantly from one question to the next.
To detect output contagion, we tested whether the performance of subjects in each of our four topolo-
gies improved across trials within each question, above the progression observed in the Baseline. For
example, in the case of the Clustered topology, we conducted a logistic regression in which the predic-
tors were the trial (first, last), the topology (Baseline, Clustered), and their interaction. What counts
as evidence for process contagion is a significant interaction between trial and topology, showing that
increase in performance in the network group is greater than in the Baseline group. We obtained
such evidence for all topologies except Clustered. In all other topologies, subjects’ performance largely
improved across trials, as the correct response to each question spread in turn across the network.
The Clustered topology was an exception insofar as it seemed unable to improve performance over
the Baseline group. One possible reason might be that connectivity in the Clustered network is insuf-
ficient to spread the correct, analytical response. To test whether the individual connectivity of a node
was linked to the final performance of the subject in this node, we computed an index of connectivity
(global distance to all other nodes, i.e., closeness centrality) and an index of final performance (average
proportion of correct responses during the last trial of each question), for each node in each network.
As expected, they were significantly correlated, r(78) = .38, p < .0001.
3. DISCUSSION
Our data show that networks can help to solve analytic problems – but with a caveat. Networks do
not propagate the analytic reasoning style required to independently arrive at correct answers. They
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can only propagate the correct response to analytic problems, one at a time. This failure to propagate
analytical processing is striking. Consider that it is possible to prime analytical processing using very
subtle cues—such as an evocative image of Rodin’s Thinker [Gervais and Norenzayan 2012] or listing
questions using a challenging font [Alter et al. 2007]. How can we explain, then, that repeated exposure
to the analytic output of peers in a network, and even the subsequent recognition and adoption of their
correct answer, all fail to prime analytic reasoning in subsequent tasks?
Social learning is a low-cost phenomenon because learners evaluate behaviors without necessarily
understanding what makes a behavior successful. The trade-off, though, is that without that deep un-
derstanding, learners can be inaccurate in what they choose to copy [Boyd et al. 2011]. This propensity
may explain why subjects persist in copying only analytical responses in our tasks, whilst copying an-
alytical processing would be fairly easy, cost-less, and financially rewarding. We have therefore iden-
tified an unreflective copying bias, thus contributing to our understanding of the limits of increased
connectivity in amplifying collective intelligence [Sparrow et al. 2011; Lorenz et al. 2011].
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